Weak trust between immigrants and law enforcement may undermine law enforcement agencies' ability to keep communities safe. This paper documents that an immigrant's willingness to report crime is affected by immigration enforcement policies. I analyze the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), which was launched by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency in 2015. Under PEP, ICE focused enforcement efforts on immigrants convicted of serious crimes and shifted resources away from immigration-related offenses, thereby lowering the cost to immigrants of reporting crime to the police. I use incident-level data from the Dallas Police Department that include the name and ethnicity of all complainants to show that the number of incidents reported by Hispanic individuals increased by 10 percent after the launch of PEP. The results of this study suggest that reducing immigration enforcement of individuals who do not pose a threat to public safety can potentially be one way to enhance trust between immigrant communities and the police. * I am grateful to Leah Boustan, Will Dobbie, and Ilyana Kuziemko for guidance and support throughout this project. I also thank
Introduction
The ability of law enforcement officials to detect and sanction criminal behavior depends on an individual's willingness to report crime. However, many Hispanic individuals in the United
States have a specific reason for not reporting crime to the police: unauthorized immigrants, or individuals living with or residing near unauthorized immigrants, might fear that contact with law enforcement could result in a police officer learning about their or someone else's immigration status (see for example, Theodore 2013). Under-reporting of crime can make it more difficult for police departments to prevent and solve crimes, leading to a misallocation of resources and a lack of investigation or prosecution of offenders (Langton et al. 2012 ). Yet, a majority of crimes-even serious violent crimes-often go unreported. The National Crime Victimization Survey found that in 2016, only 42 percent of 5.7 million violent crimes and 36 percent of 15.9 million property crimes were reported to the police (Morgan and Kena 2017) . For more background and details on the 287(g) and Secure Communities programs, I refer the reader to Alsan and Yang (2018) , Miles and Cox (2014) , Wang and Kaushal (2018) , and Watson (2013) .
2 A detainer request is a written notice from ICE requesting local jails or law enforcement to detain an individual while ICE decides whether he or she will be taken into federal custody for removal purposes.
Angeles has taught me this. Yet every day our effectiveness is diminished because This paper studies whether the program that was introduced to replace Secure Communities, the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), changed the degree to which Hispanic individuals reported crime to the police. Under PEP, the agency no longer sought to detain individuals with immigration offenses alone, and instead only focused on detaining individuals convicted of significant criminal offenses. 3 In reducing the number of circumstances under which it could detain individuals, ICE attempted to re-establish cooperation with state and local jurisdictions.
By redefining ICE's priorities to only focus on individuals who posed a threat to public safety, PEP did not significantly lower the probability that an immigrant who was convicted of a serious crime would be detained. However, PEP did reduce the likelihood that an unauthorized immigrant who had not committed a crime would be detained or deported, thereby reducing the cost of reporting a crime. For these reasons, PEP-unlike most other immigration policies-directly changed the incentives for Hispanic victims to report crime, while leaving the punishment for criminal behavior unchanged.
To explore the impact of this program on a Hispanic individual's willingness to report crime, I use administrative data from the Dallas Police Department (DPD). This incident-level dataset from the DPD is relatively unique in that it includes information about a complainant's race and Hispanic ethnicity as well as his or her full name. 4 Using this information, I employ a difference-in-differences strategy, in which I estimate how Hispanic complainants' reporting behavior changes relative to reporting by non-Hispanic complainants in the same neighborhood (i.e., Census tract). In addition to the richness of its policing data, Dallas is a useful setting for evaluating this policy since slightly more than 40 percent of the population is Hispanic and the vast majority of neighborhoods are at least 20 percent Hispanic. 5 It is also worth noting that roughly 20-25 percent of Dallas County's Hispanic population is unauthorized immigrants (U.S. Census Bureau n.d.;
Migration Policy Institute 2018).
Using this identification strategy, I find that after PEP was launched, the number of incidents reported to the police by Hispanics increases by around 10 percent (relative to the mean of 37 incidents in a Census tract per quarter). A rough estimate suggests that during the year and a half that PEP was in effect, the DPD was notified of around 7,500 more incidents than it would have been otherwise. Since increased reporting or the potentially improved allocation of police resources might have dissuaded some criminal offenders from committing crime, this number is likely an underestimate. These results are robust to the definition of neighborhood used as well as to the identification of Hispanic complainants using names (as opposed to using the race/ethnicity written down by the DPD). A number of studies show that immigration policies that instill fear can affect the physical health, mental health, and economic outcomes of immigrants, and can have a "chilling" effect on their willingness to participate in federal safety-net programs (Alsan and Yang 2018; Amuedo-Dorantes et al. 2018; Wang and Kaushal 2018; Watson 2014) . Previous studies have also shown that immigration policies affect immigrants' educational attainment (Kuka et al. 2018; Liscow and Woolston 2018) . To my knowledge, this study is the first to consider the effect of immigration policies on an individual's willingness to report crime to the police.
Second, this paper is related to a number of studies, mainly in criminology and sociology, that use surveys to study the relationship between immigrant communities and law enforcement (see for example, Kirk et al. 2010 and Tyler et al. 2010 ). This paper is the first in this literature to use administrative data to estimate the causal effect of immigration enforcement on the number of interactions between immigrants and the police. Moreover, by showing how crime reporting increases when the enforcement environment changes, this study also contributes to a relatively small literature on the underreporting of crime (Carr and Doleac 2016) . Indeed, despite the millions of crimes that go unreported, little is known about the effectiveness of policies to increase an individual's willingness to report a crime.
Finally, this paper complements a large body of literature that estimates the effect of immigration enforcement on crime (Bohn et al. 2015; Chalfin and Deza 2018; Freedman et al. 2018; Miles and Cox 2014) . Within this body of literature, a big obstacle in interpreting results is differentiating whether any changes in crime are driven by changes in underlying criminal behavior or changes in crime reporting. By studying the Priority Enforcement Program-a program that reduced the cost of reporting crime for immigrant victims, while holding the punishment for serious offenses relatively constant-this study is the first in this literature to be able to directly estimate changes in crime reporting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly provides background on the implementation of PEP nationwide and in Dallas. Section 3 outlines the data utilized, presents summary statistics, and introduces the methodological framework. Section 4 presents the results, conducts robustness checks, and considers the effect of PEP on service requests. Section 5 discusses and rules out alternative explanations. 14 The reason behind the sheriff's new policy was not clear, but it was perhaps the result of growing controversy and legal challenges to immigration holds in Dallas that year.
15 I am grateful to the Immigrant Legal Resource Center for obtaining and sharing information about whether particular jurisdictions complied with PEP as well as about meetings between ICE officers and local officials. 3 Data and Methodology
Data on Police Incidents
In order to estimate whether PEP had an effect on a Hispanic individual's willingness to report crime to the police, I utilize data on police incidents in Dallas, which come from the Crime Analysis
Unit of the Dallas Police Department. These data not only include information about the incident (e.g., the location and offense code), but they also include details about the complainant (e.g., his or her full name as well as race/ethnicity). I restrict the sample to include all reported incidents in which the complainant was categorized as white, black, or Hispanic, and restrict the sample period to the years 2013 through 2016. 17 Table 1 shows the share of police incidents reported by Hispanics and non-Hispanics in Dallas. 18 would remain at those higher levels for the subsequent months.
This reported by black complainants, even though only 23 percent of Dallas is black. These differences could arise from differences in crime rates, reporting rates, or a combination of both. Table 1 also shows the breakdown of reported incidents into violent crimes (e.g., assault and robbery), property crimes (e.g., burglary and theft), part II crimes (e.g., criminal mischief, disorderly conduct), and accidents. Almost 40 percent of the incidents in these data are classified as property crimes, and the distribution of crimes is generally similar for both Hispanic and non-Hispanic complainants.
To get a better sense of the spatial distribution of incidents, panel (a) in figure 3 shows the 
Methodology
In order to formally estimate the effect of PEP on the degree to which Hispanic individuals in Dallas reported crime, I employ a difference-in-differences strategy. The spirit of the analysis is that the immigration policy change only affected Hispanic individuals' incentives to report crime, immediately clear how, or whether, they were affected by the new enforcement priorities.
while leaving the incentives unchanged for white and black individuals. I therefore compare the change in the number of police incidents reported by Hispanic individuals (treatment group) with the same change for non-Hispanic individuals (control group). The main assumption underlying this approach is that the reporting behavior of Hispanic and non-Hispanic individuals would have continued to trend similarly in the absence of PEP. This analysis also assumes that Hispanic individuals are more likely to be unauthorized immigrants (or to live with or near unauthorized immigrants).
Specifically, I estimate the following equations:
where n, h, and t index neighborhoods, Hispanic ethnicity, and time, respectively. In both equations, the dependent variable is the logged number of incidents in neighborhood n, in time period t reported by ethnicity h. 20 β 2 in equation (1) is a difference-in-differences estimate, capturing the extent to which changes in reporting before and after PEP differ for Hispanics relative to non-Hispanics. Equation (2) estimates a coefficient θ t for each quarter in the sample, so that I can plot changes in reporting over the entire time period (with the difference in reporting centered at zero in the second quarter of 2015 before PEP is launched).
Both models include time (i.e., quarter × year) fixed effects to account for time-variant factors, such as the seasonality of crime, that influence the number of police incidents. The specification also includes neighborhood fixed effects to absorb level differences in crime across neighborhoods (which are quite evident from Figure 3 ). 21 Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level.
20 Some neighborhoods have zero incidents reported by either Hispanics or non-Hispanics in a quarter. In order to incorporate these observations in the analysis, I add one to all of the counts and then apply the log transformation. I choose to use the log transformation in order to reduce the influence of large outliers and estimate the average percent change in crime reporting (since there is wide heterogeneity in crime reporting across Dallas tracts). 21 One might think that the desired specification would include neighborhood × time fixed effects in order to flexibly control for idiosyncratic shocks within a neighborhood and quarter. However, each neighborhood × time pair in the data has exactly one treatment and one control observation. So by construction, the empirical approach already compares the treatment and control units within a neighborhood and quarter. The 10 percent increase implies that on average, the police was notified of three to four more incidents in each neighborhood per quarter following the introduction of PEP. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that in the six quarters that PEP was in effect, the police was notified of around 7,500 more incidents than they would have been if the enforcement priorities had not changed. 22 Another way to gauge the magnitude of this estimate is to consider the average number of incidents reported by Hispanic individuals before PEP: 22.7 incidents per neighborhood per quarter. If we assume that PEP only affects the behavior of unauthorized immigrants (and not of individuals in time fixed effects does not change the treatment-control differences, and therefore mechanically does not affect the difference-in-differences coefficient.
their networks) and that roughly 20 percent of the Hispanic population is unauthorized, then the 10 percent result implies that the police saw roughly 2.27 more incidents on a base of 4.54 (0.2×22.7),
suggesting an implied effect of the policy of roughly 50 percent.
A standard model of crime predicts that offenders alter their criminal behavior in response to a change in the probability of getting caught. Along these lines, if the probability that an individual reports crime increased or if the police potentially improved their allocation of resources following PEP, then we would predict that criminals in Dallas subsequently committed fewer crimes. I thus conclude that the 7,500 calculation is likely an underestimate; the police would have been notified of even more crimes had offenders not changed their criminal behavior in response to PEP. Finally, the incident-level data include all types of police incidents including assault, robbery, drug offenses, animal bites, and accidents. Ex-ante, it is not clear whether one would expect the effect of this policy to be larger for more or less serious crimes. On the one hand, it is possible that many immigrants were not reporting any crimes to the police prior to PEP, so I would expect to see a larger effect for more serious crimes (since individuals likely see greater value in reporting violent or property crimes). On the other hand, if individuals were already reporting serious crimes to the police before PEP but were on the margin of reporting less serious crimes, then I would expect to see a larger effect for this latter group. To test this question empirically, I restrict the sample to incidents that are classified as either violent or property crimes using the Uniform Crime Report offense code. 23 I find an increase of about 4 percent in the reporting of these more serious incidents. Alternatively, when I restrict the sample to all incidents that are neither violent nor property crimes, I find an increase of about 8 percent in the reporting of these less serious crimes.
Columns 3 and 4 of table 2 show these results. These findings suggest that PEP incentivized Hispanic individuals, who might have previously been hesitant to interact with law enforcement over relatively less serious matters, to report these crimes to the police.
Alternate Definitions of Neighborhoods and Hispanic Ethnicity
There are alternative ways to divide Dallas into neighborhoods besides using as Hispanic. 25 The Hispanic identification written down by the DPD is highly correlated to the Hispanic identification using surnames for all years in the sample period (overall correlation of 0.88), implying that the DPD data are relatively accurate in identifying Hispanic complainants.
Appendix figure A3 shows that the results are hardly changed when using surnames, which leads me to conclude that the results are indeed driven by a greater number of Hispanic complainants and not by different patterns in identifying Hispanic ethnicity over time.
No Effect on Service Requests
As noted earlier, previous studies, such as Alsan and Yang (2018) and Watson (2014) , find that immigrant individuals reduce their participation in safety net programs when the enforcement environment becomes more hostile toward unauthorized immigrants. Based on this evidence, it is plausible that PEP could have a symmetric opposite effect, encouraging individuals to interact with government authorities and to participate in civilian activity. To consider this possibility, I use data on service requests sent in to the city government. These requests are typically submitted via telephone, the web, or mobile apps for issues such as street repairs, dead animals, missed recycling, and missing garbage roll carts.
It is not clear ex-ante whether we should expect an increase in the number of service requests.
On the one hand, PEP's narrower enforcement priorities do not alter the costs or benefits of submitting service requests for Hispanic immigrants; unlike law enforcement, city officials do not have a partnership with ICE, and thus cannot detain individuals. We thus should expect to see these data also include a precise location so that I can identify the Census tract for each request.
Panel (a) of figure 7 shows an analogous graph to figure 4, but for these service requests.
Graphing the raw data in this way highlights that the number of service requests submitted by Hispanic and non-Hispanics mirrored each other closely both before and after PEP. Indeed, the share of Hispanic complainants in this data remains constant between 20-25 percent during this entire time period. I then perform the corresponding difference-in-differences analysis; panel (b) of figure 7 shows that unlike the number of police incidents, the number of service requests submitted by Hispanic complainants did not change significantly with PEP.
The reason behind this lack of an increase is ambiguous. It certainly is possible that Hispanic individuals in Dallas understand the difference between contacting law enforcement to report a crime and contacting city officials for a service request. 27 If this distinction is clear, then PEP's narrower enforcement priorities would not change a Hispanic individual's incentives to submit a service request and this lack of an increase serves as a type of placebo test for the policy. However, it is also possible that immigrant communities make essentially no requests for government services (or prefer to do so anonymously), so we might not expect the number of requests to respond to the immigration enforcement environment. 28 Nevertheless, regardless of why there is not a change in the number of service requests, the lack of an increase-in contrast to the increase in reported crime-supports the idea that PEP primarily enhanced trust in law enforcement.
Ruling out alternative explanations
So far, I have found that the number of incidents reported by Hispanic individuals increased by about 10 percent after the introduction of PEP. However, if something besides individuals' willingness to report crime changed at the same time that PEP was introduced, then I could be incorrectly attributing this rise in the number of complaints to increased willingness to report crime. In this section, I consider two other possible explanations-increased criminal behavior and population growth-that could result in more Hispanic individuals reporting crime to the police. 27 The City of Dallas has tried to increase awareness of city services in the past few years. In the fall of 2015, they instituted a program called "City Hall on the Go!", in which a vehicle drives around neighborhoods five days a week with the purpose of taking City Hall to the community and of increasing awareness of city services. The vehicle specifically targets locations that are in primarily Hispanic neighborhoods.
Increasing Criminal Behavior
The reason that PEP is a particularly useful policy for studying an individual's willingness to report crime is that it changes the incentive to report crime, but does not alter the punishment for serious criminal offenses. Moreover, the empirical strategy allows me to see how reporting by Hispanic complainants changes relative to reporting by non-Hispanic complainants in the same neighborhood, thereby holding overall crime levels constant in the comparison. Nevertheless, if
Hispanic offenders decided to commit more crimes at the time of PEP's introduction (whether coincidentally or intentionally), then part of the increase in the number of Hispanic complaints could be driven by this increase in criminal behavior; this scenario would occur since Hispanic offenders typically commit crimes against other Hispanic individuals. 29 One possible explanation for an increase in Hispanic crime rates is PEP's focus on convictions (as opposed to criminal charges); if Hispanic offenders believe that PEP has now decreased their overall likelihood of being detained and they believe that this decreased cost outweighs the higher probability of getting caught (from increased reporting or potentially improved allocation of police resources), then they might decide to commit more crimes. 30 I only count each individual once for an arrest regardless of the number of charges against him or her. Because most incidents are not immediately resolved with an arrest, only a small share of the incidents in the data can be linked to specific arrests.
of suspects who are Hispanic (for incidents reported by non-Hispanic complainants) also seems to stay relatively unchanged over this time period. 31 Finally, I can look at this same time series, but using all arrests and all suspects (i.e., not just those that can be linked to incidents); results are shown in panel (b) of figures 8 and 9. Like with the previous graphs, the lack of an increase in the share of arrestees and suspects who are Hispanic implies that Hispanic individuals in Dallas did not suddenly commit more crimes following the introduction of PEP relative to non-Hispanic offenders. These results provide support for PEP not altering Hispanic offenders' propensity to commit crime, and thus allow me to conclude that the increase in reported crime that I find is likely not driven by changes in underlying criminal behavior. 32 Overall, these findings suggest that at least in Dallas, PEP achieved its intended goal of increasing trust in law enforcement without adversely impacting crime rates.
Population Growth
The main result of the analysis shows that Hispanic individuals reported more incidents to the To test whether there was an influx of Hispanic people into the Dallas area around the time of 31 In this dataset, I allow the same individual to be a suspect for multiple incidentsUnlike with the arrest-level data, many more incidents have suspects, so the sample size used for this figure is much larger. Data are missing for the latter half of 2014 due to a change in the DPD's Records Management System. 
Local Enforcement of PEP
As noted earlier, even though PEP was a federal program, it was enforced locally by the Dallas County Sheriff's office. Shortly after the introduction of PEP, Sheriff Lupe Valdez implemented a policy for reviewing detainer requests from ICE, with the vetting process being very similar to PEP's softer enforcement priorities. 34 Sheriff Valdez received significant media attention after 33 The previous result showing a lack of an increase in service requests provides some additional support for the argument that it was not population growth driving the increase in complaints. If there had been a large influx of Hispanic individuals into Dallas during this time period who were comfortable reporting incidents to the police, then we might also expect to see some increase in the number of service requests submitted by Hispanic individuals. The fact that the number of requests does not change provides some evidence against population growth driving the increase in reporting. However, as I note above, interpreting the null result for service requests is not straightforward since it is possible that Hispanic individuals, and immigrants in particular, tend to not make requests for government services. 34 The Dallas Morning News reported that the Sheriff introduced this policy after meeting with ICE officials as well as activists from the Texas Organizing Project, and that the policy was well-received by the activist group. Given the amount of media attention given to the clash between the Sheriff and the Governor, it is possible that Hispanic individuals were more willing to report crime because of the Sheriff's new policy, rather than because of ICE's program (even though on paper the two policies were very similar). To try to estimate how much of this increased willingness to report crime was Dallas-specific, I consider the case of nearby Austin. 37 The Sheriff 37 I submitted similar data requests to a number of police departments around the country, and besides Dallas, Austin was the only other police department willing to share the necessary information to do this analysis (namely, the race/ethnicity or surname of the complainant). 38 The difference in the number of detainers between Dallas County and Travis County is not surprising given that Dallas County is twice the size of Travis County. Data between the announcement and introduction of PEP are missing for a few months for Travis County, and might at times have reporting errors (especially given the large differences in the number of inmates in a short period of time).
In order to test the effect of PEP on crime reporting in Austin, I use incident-level data from the Austin Police Department. These data are less optimal than Dallas' for this analysis since the variable that indicates whether a complainant is Hispanic is missing for many individuals, and in some years more so than in others. However, I can use surnames again to identify who is likely Hispanic and run the same specifications as above. Figure 10 shows the difference in crime reporting in Austin relative to Dallas. Importantly, this figure highlights that crime reporting in the two cities is trending similarly prior to the introduction of PEP. However, the degree to which Hispanic people report more crimes to the police after PEP is quite limited in Austin, and the difference-in-differences estimate is one-third of the magnitude of the corresponding estimate in Dallas.
To try to understand the difference between the two cities, I look at the breakdown of detainer requests in Austin by an individual's most serious criminal conviction. Appendix figure A6 shows that the number of detainer requests issued for individuals convicted of a misdemeanor or for those without a conviction fell slightly following the announcement of PEP. Due to the overall lack of long-term data on ICE detainers after the introduction of PEP, it is hard to draw concrete conclusions about the program's enforcement; however, this figure does show that in 2015, the number of detainers issued for individuals without a conviction was typically higher than the number of detainers issued for those with a felony conviction. If the pattern in this figure is suggestive of ICE and Travis County not enforcing PEP's softer guidelines as stringently as Dallas County, then it might not be all that surprising that Hispanic individuals in Austin did not increase their crime reporting as much as their counterparts in Dallas. 39 Without similar data from more cities, it is difficult to come to any definitive conclusions. 40 39 This result would be in line with Alsan and Yang (2018) 's finding that localities that fail to target serious offenders during Secure Communities generate a stronger behavioral response in terms of not participating in safety-net programs. In the same vein, if Travis County is not targeting serious offenders effectively, then we would expect Hispanic individuals to be less trusting of local law enforcement. 40 In theory, one could do a similar analysis with data from the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS). Unfortunately, the variable for Hispanic ethnicity is often missing in this data (i.e., missing for more than 30 percent of victims in the 2015 extract) and many states with large Hispanic populations do not report incidents to this system. For example, in the 2015 extract, there are no reporting agencies from many states with significant Hispanic populations (namely, California, Florida, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, and New York). In Texas, none of the reporting agencies in the five biggest cities provided information to NIBRS in 2015; individuals in Forth Worth However, these results do suggest that the increase in crime reporting in Dallas was not purely driven by a change in federal policy, but rather that the local enforcement of the new priorities likely played a role. It remains unclear what exactly drove the increase (i.e., the Sheriff's enforcement of the softer priorities, the media attention around the Sheriff's policy, the DPD's efforts in communicating the policy changes to Hispanic communities, or a combination of these factors). 41 Nevertheless, the difference between the two cities does seem to imply that communicating and enforcing an immigration policy-and not just passing a new policy-is important if the goal is to illicit a specific community response (in this case, increasing trust in law enforcement and thus the amount of crime reporting).
Conclusion
In this paper, I study the launch of the Priority Enforcement Program and estimate the degree to which the program increased Hispanic individuals' willingness to report crime to the police.
PEP was introduced to replace Secure Communities, and thus to re-establish cooperation between ICE and local law enforcement. In order to do so, PEP restricted ICE's enforcement priorities to focus only on individuals who posed a threat to public safety, and not on individuals who had only committed civil immigration offenses. These narrower priorities therefore reduced the cost of reporting crime for immigrant victims, while keeping the punishment for serious criminal offenses relatively unchanged. Unlike other immigration policies that typically affect both victims and offenders, the introduction of this program allows me to directly estimate the effect of immigration enforcement on crime reporting.
Using incident-level data from the Dallas Police Department that contains the ethnicity of make up almost a third of the victims in the state, and of these, 30 percent have missing data for Hispanic ethnicity.
Since the difference-in-differences is contingent on accurate and consistent identification of Hispanic individuals over time, administrative data from police departments (that includes a reliable Hispanic identifier as well as names and locations in order to verify the accuracy of the Hispanic identifier) is far better for this analysis. Finally, it is worth noting that the NIBRS data is collected at the agency level, which would not allow me to compare individuals residing in neighborhoods with similar crime levels.
the complainant, I employ a difference-in-differences strategy to estimate the degree to which reporting by Hispanic complainants changed relative to reporting by non-Hispanic complainants in the same neighborhood. I find that after PEP was introduced, the number of incidents reported by More generally, the findings of this paper suggest that lessening immigration enforcement of individuals who do not pose a threat to public safety (i.e., crime victims) can enhance trust between immigrant communities and the police. These results are also consistent with the idea that increased community-based policing is important for improving public safety and the effectiveness of police departments. NOTE: These data include all incidents for 2013-2016 in which the complainant was classified as white, black, or Hispanic. Non-Hispanic refers to individuals categorized as "white" or "black" in the data. All crimes are classified using the Uniform Crime Report offense code. Violent crime refers to assault, human trafficking, intoxicated manslaughter, murder, and robbery. Property crime refers to arson, burglary, lost property, thefts, and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (UUMV). Part II crime refers to crimes classified as criminal mischief, disorderly conduct, DWI, embezzlement, forge and counterfeit, fraud, narcotics and drugs, offenses against child, prostitution, runaway, and sex offenses. Accidents include incidents like firearms accidents, motor vehicle accidents, and occupational injuries, among others. These four shares do not sum to one because incidents might have fallen into alternative categories (e.g., pending investigation, suicide, animal bite). NOTE: This figure uses incident-level data from the Dallas Police Department using all incidents between 2013 and 2016. The first column reproduces the main estimate from column 1 of table 2. The second and third column vary the definition of neighborhood. The fourth column uses the complainant's surname to identify whether he or she is Hispanic. "Average incidents" refers to the average number of incidents per tract per quarter. Standard errors are clustered at the beat and reporting areas level in columns 2 and 3, respectively, and at the tract level in columns 1 and 4.
Figures and Tables
A Appendix Figure NOTE: This figure plots the number of detainer requests over time, using data on detainer requests from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC). "Felony" refers to detainer requests issued for individuals convicted of a felony or aggravated felony. "No conviction" refers to detainer requests issued for individuals who were either charged but not convicted of a crime or neither charged nor convicted of a crime. The dashed and solid lines mark the announcement and launch of PEP, respectively.
